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I. INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota, an apparent confusion between equitable and
statutory redemption rights has evolved from numerous court
decisions and ineffective statutory language.' This confusion may
arise whenever tide to property is transferred. In situations after
foreclosure, where the mortgagee is the purchaser, the bank buys for
the amount of debt and the debtor loses both the property and any
equity established over time. State v. Zacher is a classic example.
John Zacher defaulted on his mortgage loan and Staples State Bank
foreclosed.3 The bank purchased Zacher's property at the foreclosure
sale.4 A single day before the mortgage redemption period expired,
Zacher removed a new furnace and air conditioner, lighting fixtures,
doors, and paving blocks from the driveway; he even cut the sewer
line.5
In Zacher, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the bank had a
security interest in Zacher's property that continued after the
foreclosure sale to the end of the statutory redemption period.6 The
1. The primary reason for the present confusion is the functional similarity of
these terms. See discussion infra part Il.C, and note 58 and accompanying text.
2. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1995).
3. Id. at 469.
4. Id. The bank held a foreclosure sale by advertisement. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 473. The statutory right to redeem one's property against a foreclosure
action begins immediately upon the completion of a foreclosure sale. 59 CJ.S.
Mortgages § 819 (1993). The length of this redemption period is determined by statute
1
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Zacher court considered Minnesota case law, legislative intent, and
social policy issues in applying its equitable power.' The court,
however, failed to clarify the difference between equitable and
statutory redemption rights to support this decision.'
This Case Note will analyze equitable and statutory redemption and
evaluate the Zacher decision in light of these principles. In Part II, the
Note will review the development of both equitable and statutory
redemption and discuss why Minnesota has confused these two terms.
Part III will discuss the facts of the Zacher case and the court's analysis.
In Part IV, this Note will criticize the Zacher decision for failing to
distinguish the redemption principles. Part IV will also discuss ways
to resolve the present confusion.
Finally, this Note will conclude that despite the lack of clarity
available, the Minnesota Judiciary or Legislature could eliminate this
confusion by better defining these terms. A clarification of redemp-
tion principles may provide a legal mechanism to arrive at a fair-
in each state. Id. See infra note 8 for a discussion of statutory redemption.
Redemption rights developed in response to unjust mortgage agreements. See infra
note 18. The mortgage instrument developed early in history and originated as far
back in time as the Roman Empire. See infra note 11. In the late 19th century, a
mortgage was defined as "[a] conditional conveyance of land, designed as security for
the payment of money, the fulfillment of some contract, or performance of some other
act, and to be void upon such payment or performance." 1 FRAN Cs HILLIARD, THE
LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 2, at 4 (Boston, Little Brown
& Co., 1872). This definition is valid today. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1009-10 (6th
ed. 1990).
7. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 471-73 (Minn. 1993).
8. Equity of redemption is defined as "[t]he right of the mortgagor of property
to redeem [his or her property] after it has been forfeited, at law, by a breach of the
condition of the mortgage (i.e., default in mortgage payments), upon paying the
amount of debt, interest, and costs [due]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed.
1990).
The equitable right to redeem is often exercised. I GEORGE OSBORNE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 302, at 625 (2d ed. 1970). It arises only upon breach
of the mortgage agreement and lasts until the foreclosure sale is completed. 1 id. at
624-25; see a/so 1 GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST AND OTHER SECURrIY
DEVICES AS TO LAND, §§ 3-5, at 11-18 (1943) (discussing redemption after default, its
origin in Roman code, and its further development in English Courts of Equity).
Statutory redemption is defined as "[a] time period during which a defaulted
mortgage, land contract, deed of trust, etc., can be redeemed. Such period is
commonly provided for by state statute." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1278 (6th ed.
1990); see 2 GLENN, supra, §§ 227-228, at 1091-99.
The statutory right to redeem is rarely exercised. 1 OSBORNE, supa, § 8, at 18.
Statutory redemption is separate from the mortgagor's equity of redemption. 1 id. at
17. Statutory redemption arises only after the equitable redemption period has ended,
meaning that the property has been foreclosed by sale. 1 id. To redeem the
foreclosed property, the entire mortgage must be paid in cash. 1 id. at 18.
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EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
market price in foreclosure sale proceedings. It also could avoid the
acquisition of property through economic hardship.
II. BACKGROUND
Mortgage law evolved at glacial speed, as history reveals a pattern of
remedial measure after remedial measure.9 Anglo-American mort-
gage law developed almost completely in English Courts of Equity and
its origin pre-dates the Norman Conquest.' ° In fact, the equity of
redemption principle found in English mortgage law originated under
Roman civil law."
9. See I GLENN, supra note 8, §§ 1-2, at 1-10.
10. GEORGE T. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY:. A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY, § 149, at 252 (10th ed. 1929).
Modem law which directs the use of land as security today is directly traceable to the
Glanvillian mortgage of Medieval England. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 1, at 1-2.
The term "mortgagor" refers to a person who pledges his or her property for some
particular purpose, such as security for a loan. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1012 (6th ed.
1990). Likewise, the term "mortgagee" refers to the individual that lends money for
the property pledged by the mortgagor. Id.
11. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION
TO MODERN LAW, 381-82 (1989). Equitable redemption rights arose from English
Courts of Equity and reflect the court's desire to balance power between the mortgagor
and mortgagee. See infra notes 31-34. This balancing of powers concept, so prevalent
in English common law, actually began under Roman law. 1 GLENN, supra note 8, § 57,
at 382-383.
Roman civil law was not cruel to the debtor for a debtor was allowed two years to
redeem his land if he paid all past due debt caused by his default. W. W. BUCKLAND,
A TEXT BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN, 477 (3d ed. 1966); see
BURDICK, supra, at 381-82 (1989). Roman civil law also provided a right of foreclosure
to the creditor. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA, § 1005, at 203 (9th ed. 1984). Under the
Roman law hypothera mortgage, the land remained in the debtor's possession, but under
debtor default, the creditor was entitled to an aaio-hypothecaria, an action in rem to
obtain possession of the encumbered property. 2 id. § 1007, at 205.
Early English mortgage law treated the debtor differently. The Glanvillian gagewas
the earliest mortgage agreement, arising before Medieval England. 1 OSBORNE, supra
note 8, § 1, at 2. Under the late Glanvillian gage, the ggee (the creditor) was allowed
possession of the land under two distinctly different mortgage agreements: the v/f-gage
(living gage) and the mort-gage (dead gage). I id. at 3. Under a mort-gage, the gagee
kept all profits and rents and held the debtor liable for repayment of the loan. 1 id.
The parties agreed to end all debtor rights to the secured land upon default by the
debtor. 1 id. at 3-4.
By the 15th century, these rules gave way to a grant of fee simple subject to debtor
performance of all mortgage covenants. See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON
MORTGAGES, § 2, at 4 (1934). Most mortgage agreements required the debtor to pay
rent by a certain date. Id. If rent was not performed in a timely manner, the gagee's
fee simple interest would end and the estate would revert to the creditor. Id. This
imbalance of power between the gagee and debtor gave rise to the term "Doomsday,"
the very day rent was paid or the land was forever lost. See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND,
1995]
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On the other hand, the statutory right of redemption developed in
Colonial American courts 12 and evolved to address various inadequa-
cies of equitable redemption. I" Historically, the mortgagor's com-
mon law right to redeem his land had terminated upon foreclosure. 4
The mortgagor's statutory privilege to redeem, however, began at
foreclosure. 5 In Minnesota, this distinction became confused over
time.
A. The Equity of Redemption
English mortgage law presented a cruel reality to the mortgagor.
6
Under the common law, any land securing a debt vested completely
in the mortgagee.' 7 The mortgagor's tide to the land would termi-
DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND, § 4, at 211 (1921) (referring to Doomsmen and the
Domesday Book used in Medieval English boroughs to enforce land rents). The equity
of redemption developed in this context to mitigate this imbalance of power. Id.
12. See Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutoy Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference For Protection Over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15-21 (1985)
(discussing the development of statutory redemption in the early territorial American
courts). The earliest legislative grants for statutory redemption occurred in the first
several decades after 1800. Id.
13. Edgar N. Durfee & Delmar W. Doddridge, RedemptionFromForeclosureSale-The
Uniforin Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825, 838-41 (1925); see Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory
Redemption Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's Redemption Statute in Two Counties Between
1881 and 1980, 70 IOWA L. REV. 343, 347-49 (1985); William C. Prather, Foreclosure of
the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 420, 432, 452-55 (1957).
14. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 17. The equitable right of redemption
allowed a mortgagor to redeem his property up to the date of foreclosure. Upon
foreclosure, the mortgagor lost all claims to his property. 1 LEONARD A. JONES, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY, § 7, at 9 (1928) (citing
Casborne v. Scarfe, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (1737) which affirmed the right of equitable
redemption to the English Courts of Equity). The phrase "equity of redemption"
became common by 1700, but the case which introduced this concept was decided in
1654 and published in 1693. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 13 (citing Duchess of
Hamilton v. Countess of Dirlton, 1 Ch.R. 165 (1693)).
15. Although statutory redemption is similar in function to the equity of
redemption, it is very different in application. See infra part II.B.
16. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 5, at 8-12. Under English common law, the
mortgagor was subject to great hardships if he did not comply with the conditions of
the mortgage. The mortgagor would forfeit possession of the land no matter how great
his inherent value was with respect to the debt by which it was mortgaged. 2 STORY,
supra note 11, § 1012, at 207.
17. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 5, at 10. The rule under English common law
was that possession of the mortgaged land was given to the mortgagee. 1 id. This
conveyance of a fee estate with conditions (e.g., monthly rent due) was performed
through a seizin ceremony, and thus, required the transfer of possession rights to the
mortgagee. 1 id. The term "mortgagee" arose from English common law and refers
to any person that provides a mortgage loan and receives land as security for the loan.
BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY, 1012 (6th ed. 1990).
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nate immediately upon default.'" In response, English courts
developed the principle of equitable redemption to end property
forfeitures caused by simple defaults of mortgage agreements.' 9
Equity intervened to ensure that a mortgagee did not use the secured
transaction as a means to acquire the mortgagor's property
0
Thus, English courts created the equity of redemption to preserve
the mortgage as a security device.
2'
The doctrine of equitable redemption improved the mortgagor's
status.22 English courts allowed the mortgagor to avoid forfeiture and
redeem his property when he paid off the debt that secured his
land.23 Moreover, the mortgagor could prevent a windfall to the
18. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 1, at 4-5. The mortgage was considered a usurious
instrument in English common law. 1 id. at 4. When a debtor failed to pay by a
specified time, the mortgagee could do whatever he chose to do with the debtor's
property. 1 id. By the time of Edward the First, the English Courts of Law concluded
that a mortgagor who missed payment had no recourse to his land. 1 i&. Such a
mortgage was unsatisfactory to the mortgagor because the mortgagor lost possession
of his property. 1 id. at 5.
19. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 1, at 5. After Edward the First, the English Courts
of Equity introduced equitable redemption to weaken the mortgagee's usurious control
over the debtor. 1 id. This balancing of power between the mortgagee and the debtor
gave the debtor the ability to redeem his property despite a payment default. 1 id. § 6,
at 12; see 1 JONES, supra note 14, §§ 7-8, at 8-11; 1 GLENN, supra note 8, §§ 3-4, at 12-17.
20. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 13-14. Because the value of the property
often exceeded the value of the debt encumbering it, debtor default often resulted in
a forfeiture, which the English courts of law and equity abhorred. 1 id. at 14; see also
I JoNEs, supra note 14, § 8, at 10-11. See generaly 1 GLENN, supra note 8, § 3 (noting
the triumph of equitable principles over technical rules in English mortgage law).
21. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 13. The practice of leaving the mortgagor
in possession, however, outweighed the creditor's security interest in the property. 1
id. at 8. By the 14th century, the conveyance of fee upon condition subsequent
emerged as the dominant mortgage form and has lasted to the present. 1 id.; see 1
BIsPHAM, supra note 10, § 151, at 254-57; see also Emanuel College v. Evans, 21 Eng.
Rep. 494 (1625) (noting that redemption assured that the mortgagee received payment
of the debt by allowing the mortgagor to possess the secured land until payment was
made).
22. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 12. The equity of redemption relieved the
debtor of unjust property acquisitions by his mortgagee, provided legal certainty to a
transaction plagued with usurious conditions, and balanced the mortgagee's power to
seize property against the debtor's right to remain in possession. 1 id. at 12-14.
23. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 13. The mortgagor had to pay all past due
principal and interest within a reasonable time after forfeiture, and the mortgagee now
had to go to court and obtain a decree to order the debtor to pay on a fixed day. 1
id. at 12-13. This day became known as "Law Day." See BURDIcK, supra note 11, at 382.
An important maxim developed in mortgage law. The phrase "once a mortgage,
always a mortgage" meant that parties to a mortgage could not declare that upon a
particular event, the mortgage would cease to be a mortgage and become an absolute
conveyance. 1 JONES, supra note 14, § 8, at 10. An agreement to cut off the right of
redemption was always held to be void, and thus, the mortgagor could prevent an
1995]
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mortgagee that would arise if the land sold at a greater value than the
underlying debt.
24
Equitable redemption was originally a personal right and later
became an equitable estate in land. Colonial American courts
adopted this principle, 26 and the State of Minnesota first recognized
the equity of redemption in 1865Y.2 Today this right remains an
inherent part of every mortgage agreement.
28
Unfortunately, the principle of equitable redemption was not fair to
the mortgagee. 9  The mortgagee held a high risk position as legal
title to the property was subject to the mortgagor's possession, which
unjust transfer of his property to the mortgagee. 1 id.
To accomplish this, English courts required the mortgagee to submit a bill for the
debt owed on the land provided as a security. See 1 GLENN, supra note 8, § 59.1, at 397-
400. Thereafter, the chancery was asked to set a date for payment. 1 id. If the debt
still remained after that date, the mortgagor was barred from redeeming his land; at
that time, both legal and equitable title vested in the mortgagee. 1 id. at 398-99.
24. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 14.
25. 1 JONES, supra note 14, § 7, at 8-9 (citing Casbome v. Scarfe, 26 Eng. Rep. 377
(1737), where the English Court of Chancery held that mortgaged land is only a pledge
or security for money and does not alter the mortgagor's personal right of possession).
The equity of redemption was separated from possession and became transferable
as an equitable estate under common law. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 7, § 8, at 16.
Moreover, the estate in land could be conveyed to heirs, devised, and even mortgaged.
1 id. Eventually, the redemption interest became an asset that could be reached by
third party creditors. 1 id. at 17; see also Casborne v. Scarfe, 26 Eng. Rep. 377, 380
(1737) (presenting various claims by heirs for an equitable division of the estate).
26. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 13, at 23. America inherited the English law of
mortgages. Much of mortgage law arose from the English dual system of law and
equity. 1 id.
American colonies accepted this dual system of law and equity. 1 id. For example,
in 1970, strict foreclosure (foreclosure without statutory redemption) was in common
use in Connecticut. 1 id. § 312, at 651. The majority of states, however, do not permit
strict foreclosure remedies and have shaped equitable foreclosure remedies through
statutory provisions. 1 id. § 312, at 650; see Sheldon Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foredosure,
4 U. CHI. L REv. 575, 588 (1936) (comparing American foreclosure to the English
versions of strict and equitable foreclosure).
27. Hill v. Edwards, 11 Minn. 22, _, 11 Gil. 5, 10 (1865). The court ruled that
after a mortgage condition is broken, and until foreclosure, a mortgagee of real estate
has no conveyable interest in the property. Id
28. Borgerding Inv. Co. v. Larson, 284 Minn. 371, 374, 170 N.W.2d 322, 325
(1969); seeO'Connor v. Schwan, 190 Minn. 177, 179, 251 N.W. 180, 182 (1933) (ruling
that equity will protect a mortgage transaction because the mortgage relationship
continues to exist until foreclosure, and thus, is a form of security).
29. The threat of redemption by the mortgagor (debtor) vested a right in the
mortgagor that could not be countered, or balanced, by the mortgagee. See 1
OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 10, at 20; see also GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.2, at 7 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing disadvantages to the
mortgagee under English law).
[VOL. 21
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could go on forever."0 The creation of equitable redemption
required a means for ending the mortgagor's infinite right to
possess."' The English courts responded with foreclosure as a way to
limit the mortgagor's power.3 2 Foreclosure and redemption are
essentially correlative rights under common law.33  Foreclosure,
however, did nothing to address the windfall given to the mortgagee
when the mortgagor was unable to redeem the land.s'
B. Statutory Redemption
Statutory redemption rights were created in the United States in the
early 1800s"5 to solve the problem of price inadequacy that often
arose through foreclosure actions.3 6 These rights were not enacted
to empower the mortgagor.37 Rather, statutory rights were passed to
30. See 1 GLENN, supra note 8, § 57, at 381-82.
31. 1 id. at 381. English courts recognized that if the equity of redemption was
not limited in some way, the mortgagor's tide could effectively go on forever. 1 id. at
384. This imbalance of power between the mortgagor and mortgagee would destroy
the mortgage as a security device. 1 id. at 382-83.
32. See 1 GLENN, supra note 8, § 59, at 396-97. From the mortgagee's perspective,
strict foreclosure provided a court decree to end the mortgagor's equity of redemption
unless the mortgagor could redeem the land within the time set by the court. 1 id.,
§ 59.1, at 397-99.
33. 2 HILuARD, supra note 6, ch. 26, §§ 1-2, at 30-31.
34. The mortgagor was often unable to redeem his land due to economic
hardship. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 311, 648-50. Because strict foreclosure ended
the mortgagor's equity of redemption, it often created a great injustice to the
mortgagor. 1 id. at 650. The mortgagee's act of foreclosure had the effect of final and
absolute ejectment upon the mortgagor. 1 id. at 648. If the mortgaged land was worth
more than the debt owed, the mortgagee would receive a windfall at the mortgagor's
expense. 1 id. at 650. Essentially, the mortgagee could acquire the land through the
mortgagor's economic hardship. 1 id. See generaly Note, Strict Foredosur: A Negected
Remedy, 25 VA. L. REv. 947 (1939) (referring to the English common law method of
foreclosure as the American equivalent of strict foreclosure).
35. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 18 n.50. The statutory right to redeem is
separate and distinct from the mortgagor's equity of redemption; it arises only after the
land has been foreclosed by sale. 1 id. at 17. This type of legislation can be traced
back to 1820, when international economic disturbance caused the United States to
experience a land boom collapse following the Napoleonic Wars. 1 id. at 18 n.50. The
development of statutory redemption rights occurred in Minnesota in 1866. See MINN.
GEN. STAT., ch. 81, § 13 (1866).
36. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 18. The statutory redemption period
addresses price inadequacy in four ways: (1) it protects debtors from high personal
obligations that arise from deficient foreclosures; (2) it allows defaulting debtors to
regain their land; (3) it protects unsecured creditors from having to share unencum-
bered assets with the holders of a deficiency judgment; and (4) it allows creditors to
take advantage of an increase in value of the foreclosed property. 1 id. at 18 n.50.
37. See 2 GLENN, supra note 8, § 228, at 1098 (pointing out that a mortgagor's last
chance to save the farm was not the primary reason for many American redemption
statutes). The statutory right of redemption was created in part to give the mortgagor
19951
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enhance the purpose of mortgage transactions: to provide land as
security for debt at a fair market value.3"
Statutory redemption had an indirect effect upon the foreclosure
sale. The redemption privilege allowed the mortgagor additional time
to repurchase his property if the foreclosure sale price was inade-
quate."s This right to redeem put pressure on bidders to pledge the
fair market value of the property" and prevented the mortgagee
from purchasing the property for a nominal amount.4 In this
manner, like the equity of redemption created by English courts,
statutory redemption helped to ensure that foreclosure sales resulted
in satisfaction of the debt and not the unjust acquisition of the
mortgagor's property.42
Unfortunately, statutory redemption did not completely solve the
problem of price inadequacy." The foreclosure sale purchaser
additional time to refinance and save his or her property. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8,
§ 8, at 17-18. It was mainly created to put pressure on the mortgagee (or other
foreclosure sale attendees) to bid for the land at its highest market value. 1 id. at 18.
A subsidiary purpose was to allow an additional period of occupancy for the hard-
pressed mortgagor. 1 id.
38. See I OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 18.
39. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 17-18. Statutory redemption price inadequacy
is a function of the foreclosure sale event. 1 id For example, assume a debtor's land
is worth $15,000 and is encumbered by a creditor lien in the amount of $10,000. At
the foreclosure sale, the land is sold for $10,000, which satisfies the creditor's lien.
Without redemption the debtor would suffer a loss of $5000, and the purchaser would
realize the $5000 as a gain. The debtor can resolve his loss and the purchaser's gain
by redeeming the property from the purchaser at any time within the statutory
redemption period. If the debtor does not have $10,000, he cannot exercise his right
of redemption, despite the price inadequacy of the sale. See Bauer, supra note 13, at
365 (noting analogous example).
40. See supra note 37. Market value is achieved for the protection of the mortgagor
and all bidders present at the foreclosure sale. United States v. Stadium Apartments,
Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1970) (asserting that the objective of foreclosure is to
receive bids at fair market value). If the property is worth more than the bid value, the
court presumes that others will increase the bid amount. Id.
41. See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACMON Acr, § 3-510(b) (1978) (presenting the
mechanics of foreclosure and the idea that a foreclosure sale is a market event geared
to achieving the highest possible land value). Contra Terry Schaplow, Oregon's Statutory
Right of Redemption-Any Redeeming Qualities?, 16 WILOMTr L REv. 891, 903 (1980)
(criticizing statutory redemption rights on the grounds that bidding by non-mortgagees
is chilled because indefeasible tile is not obtained until the redemption period ends).
42. Equitable redemption allowed the debtor to bring past payments up to date
and avoid unjust forfeiture of his land. See supra note 23. If the foreclosure sale price
is inadequate, the mortgagee can exercise his statutory right to redeem and avoid an
unjust property taking. See supra note 39.
43. Statutory redemption rights are criticized in several ways. First, to redeem, the
entire mortgage amount must be paid in cash. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8, at 18.
Yet, there would not be a foreclosure if the mortgagor could pay even a substantial part
of his debt in cash. 1 id. Second, the questionable character of title purchased at a
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received title subject to the mortgagor's statutory privilege." Vested
title could not pass to the purchaser until the mortgagor's possession
of the property ended with the statutory period.4" This created a
cloud on the title4 6 which often produced a depressed sale price.47
Statutory redemption laws have been subjected to judicial and
legislative revision,4 particularly during depressed economic peri-
ods.4 9 Although two states have repealed redemption laws,50 nearly
half of the states presently regulate after sale redemption activities.5'
foreclosure sale acts to depress the sale price. Bauer, supra note 12, at 72-75
(discussing actual benefits and costs of Iowa's system of statutory redemption). Third,
statutory redemption decreases the value of the land as a security device and usually
increases the delay and costs of the transaction. See Schaplow, supra note 41, at 903.
Finally, statutory redemption causes a delay in payment on behalf of the debtor, who
may redeem the property at the last minute. Id.
44. See Prather, supra note 13, at 431-32 (discussing the mortgagor's right of
redemption and its delay effect upon the foreclosure process).
45. Id.
46. A "cloud on title" is defined as "[a] n outstanding claim or encumbrance which,
if valid, would affect or impair the title of the owner of a particular estate, and on its
face has that effect...." BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY 255 (6th ed. 1990).
47. See Prather, supra note 13, at 432. The criticisms of statutory redemption
presented in footnote 43 (increased costs and inefficiencies) combine to create a
hardship to the foreclosure sale purchaser. The purchaser's speedy acquisition of the
land is prevented while the hopeless mortgagor has an opportunity to milk the property
through his statutory right of possession. The instability of the foreclosure sale often
leads to fewer bids and a lower sale price. Id; see Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and
Legislative Reqponse to Price Inadequay in Mortgage Forciasure Sales, 53 S. CAL L. REV. 843,
931 (1980).
48. See, e.g., Hardyston Nat'l Bank of Hamburg v. Tartamella, 267 A.2d 495, 497
(NJ. 1970). The New Jersey Supreme Court claimed that the statutory ten day
redemption period was incompatible with other jurisdictions. Id. at 498. The court
extended the mortgagor's redemption right for policy reasons. Id. at 497.
49. 1 OSBORE, supra note 8, § 8, at 18. The experience of the depression years
in the 1930s revealed that statutory redemption was inadequate in periods of severe or
extensive economic depression. 1 id To compensate for these deficiencies, a wave of
legislation followed. 1 id. Equity courts have given relief by various measures such as
refusal to confirm an inadequate bid price, ordering resales for the same reason, or
setting up fair prices initially or on resale. 1 id. §§ 330-31, at 691-95. Legislatures have
responded by lengthening the redemption period or by introducing moratoria
legislation during economic collapse. 1 id.
50. Bauer, supra note 13, at 400 n.175 (1985). Indiana and New York have
repealed existing redemption statutes. Id. (noting Act of Mar. 7, 1931, ch. 90, §§ 1, 3,
1931 Ind. Acts 257, 257-58 and Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 5235, 1962 N.Y. IAws
1297, 1454 (replacing statutory redemption with a pre-sale waiting period)).
51. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 5 n.11. Statutory redemption rights arose in
communities where farming was especially prominent. Bauer, supra note 13, at 390.
Nearly all states west of the Mississippi River, with the exception of Louisiana (civil law),
Texas, Oklahoma, and Nebraska, had some form of statutory redemption rights. Id.
at 400 n.175. As of 1985, eleven states, including Minnesota, require a pure form of
statutory redemption. See Bauer, supra note 12, at 5 n.11. In short, each statute
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The statutory privilege of redemption began in Minnesota with the
General Statute Act of 1866.2 The Minnesota Legislature has twice
acted to provide relief to mortgagors during hard economic times."
The effects of the Depression prompted a two-year moratorium on
mortgage foreclosure that was enacted in 1933 and continued until
July of 1942." A second moratorium was enacted in May of 1983 in
response to economic malaise and record unemployment trends.55
These enactments reflect the state's strong preference to protect farm
and home ownership. 6
C. Confusing The Terms
Today, the statutory right of redemption depends upon the terms
of the particular statute and the construction of these terms by the
courts.57 The confusion between equitable redemption and the
statutory privilege of redemption comes from the functional similarity
of the two principles.' Although the United States Supreme Court
generally designates who may redeem, a formula for the amount to pay, and a time
limit for the statutory redemption period. See 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 307, at 639;
see a/so 2 GLENN, supra note 8, § 229, at 1100.
52. MINN. GEN. STAT., ch. 81, § 13 (1866). The 1866 Act provided that:
The mortgagor, his heirs, [and mortgagor's] executors... whose
real property is sold in conformity [with] this chapter, may within
twelve months after such sale, redeem such property... by paying
the sum of money for which the same was sold, together with
interest on the same .... [at] the time of sale.
Id.
53. Roland C. Amundson & Lewis J. Rotman, Depression Jurisprudence Revisited
Minnesota's Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclrosu 10 WM. MITCHELL L REv. 805, 806-09
(1984) (presenting a history of moratorium legislation on redemptory statutes in
Minnesota).
54. Id. at 805.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 816.
57. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 819 (1949); seeDurfee & Doddridge, supra note 13, at 838
(stating the effect of statutory redemption is complicated by the terms of a statute, as
well as the decisions construing them).
58. Both principles allow the defaulting land owner a chance to redeem his
property. 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 7, at 15. Courts have confused these principles
because of this shared function. See Schaplow, supra note 41, at 891-95 (discussing the
Oregon Supreme Court's struggle with lower courts to clarify redemption terms and
concepts prior to 1980).
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and several state courts have made this distinction clear,59 some states
have made notable errors.60
In Minnesota, the boundary between equitable and statutory
redemption is not clearly defined. Early judicial decisions distin-
guished the two principles, 6' but later courts began to muddle the
terms. 62 Many Minnesota courts refer to the equity of redemption as
statutory redemption, 6 some courts refer to statutory redemption as
59. See Chicago & Vincennes R.R v. Fosdick, 106 U.S. 47, 71 (1882) (ruling the
equity of redemption is not exhausted until the sale is final); Parker v. Dacres, 130 U.S.
43, 48 (1889) (holding the right to redeem after the foreclosure sale is statutory); see
aiso First Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Hans, 493 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating the
equity of redemption, inherent in every mortgage, terminates at the foreclosure sale);
Land Assocs., Inc. v. Becker, 703 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (declaring the
statutory right of redemption is different from the equity of redemption); Gesa Fed.
Credit Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 696 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (reporting the right to redeem after the foreclosure sale is not a right of equity;,
it is purely statutory); Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 13, at 838 n.43 (presenting the
inherent contrast between equitable and statutory redemption).
60. See Schaplow, supra note 41, at 891 n.1. In 1882, much confusion was created
when two independent court reporters supported two very different versions of the
same Supreme Court decision for an equitable redemption case. Id.; see, e.g., Mason
v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 106 U.S. 163, 164 (1882) (presenting the unclear language
that resulted in two different versions of the Supreme Court decision).
61. Compare Hill v. Edwards, 11 Minn. 22, _, 11 Gil. 5, 10 (1865) (stating the right
of equitable redemption is an incident part of every mortgage) and Holton v. Meighen,
15 Minn. 69, - 15 Gil. 69, 79 (1870) (stating the equity of redemption exists despite
express terms to the contrary in the mortgage) with Dickinson v. Hayes, 26 Minn. 100,
101, 1 N.W. 834, 835 (1879) (stating that after foreclosure by advertisement, the only
right of redemption is that which is given by statute) and Bowen v. Bankers Life Co.,
185 Minn. 35, 38, 239 N.W. 774, 775 (1931) (advocating the same).
62. Compare Bowen v. Bankers Life Co., 185 Minn. 35, 38, 239 N.W. 774, 775
(1931) (holding that after foreclosure, the only right of redemption is that which is
given by statute) with Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 433, 249
N.W. 334, 338 (1931) aft'd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (asserting the court may extend the
period of equitable redemption to offset the statutory right of redemption) and In re
Klein, 9 F. Supp. 57 (D. Minn. 1934) (recognizing and applying the equity of
redemption after a foreclosure sale).
63. This occurs when Minnesota courts apply statutory redemption as a means for
the owners to save their land, without addressing the original statutory intent to resolve
price inadequacy. See, e.g., Kooda Bros. Constr., Inc. v. United Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n of Alexandria, 400 N.W.2d 407,409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (claiming a mechanics
lien against the debtor's property is not extinguished at the foreclosure sale because
there can be no deficiency arising from foreclosure when a property is purchased by
the mortgagee for the full amount of debt); Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 294 Minn. 126, 132-33, 200 N.W.2d 181, 184-85 (1972) (holding
the mortgagee-purchaser's right to receive rent assigned in a mortgage is terminated
upon foreclosure when the property is sold for the full amount of the debt because the
mortgagee-purchaser takes subject to unpaid debts and is presumed to have adjusted
its bid accordingly); Gardner v. W.M. Prindle & Co., 185 Minn. 147, 151, 240 N.W. 351,
352-53 (1932) (referring to the mortgagee's purchase price as the mortgagor's debt
1995]
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the equity of redemption,' while other courts do not distinguish
equitable redemption from statutory redemption and apply the
principles equivocally.65 Over time, additional confusion may have
come from inattentive reading of opinions and subsequent opinion
writing.
66
Despite the blurred boundaries created by Minnesota courts, this
confusion of terms never removed the inherent distinction between
redemption principles found in early Minnesota law. In the
General Laws Act of 1869, the legislature subtly maintained the
distinction between statutory and equitable redemption by declaring
that a security interest exists "either before or after" a foreclosure sale
and ignoring the adequacy of sale price); Tomasko v. Cotton, 200 Minn. 69, 72, 273
N.W. 628, 630 (1937) (stating a property is redeemable by statute for the mortgage
debt at foreclosure, thereby blurring the line between equitable and statutory redemp-
tion).
64. This occurs when Minnesota courts apply the balancing of powers principle of
equitable redemption to resolve price issues arising from foreclosure sales. This
principle pertains to the mortgagee/mortgagor and does not include third party
bidders. Thus, the balancing of powers principle lies outside the aim of statutory
redemption and ignores the very people the statute enlists to resolve price inadequa-
cies. Some courts use this principle to balance competing interests during the statutory
period. See, e.g., Pamperin v. Scanlan, 28 Minn. 345, 349, 9 N.W. 868, 870 (1881)
(using a balance of powers approach to solve redemption issues that arise in the
statutory period); First Nat'l Bank of Winnebago v. Boler, 291 Minn. 185, 188, 190
N.W.2d 94, 96 (1971) (extending the balancing of powers principle to include third
party bidders by stating the purpose of filing for statutory redemption is to give notice
to whomever may be competing to redeem the property and to disclose how much the
redemption may cost); Rambeck v. La Bree, 156 Minn. 310, 312, 194 N.W. 643, 645-46
(1923) (holding that the failure to correctly file redemption certificate documents does
not invalidate a mortgagor's redemption when the rights of a subsequent redemptioner
are not impaired).
65. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1993) (holding that a mortgage
continues to exist after a foreclosure sale, even though the mortgage debt itself is
extinguished). Thus, equitable redemption and statutory redemption are equivocated
despite their historically distinct and separate applications. See, e.g., Wood v. Waldon,
116 Minn. 474, 477, 134 N.W. 127, 128-29 (1912) (holding that after foreclosure, the
mortgagee is no longer a creditor but a purchaser); cf Cross Cos., Inc. v. Citizens
Mortgage Inv. Trust, 305 Minn. 111, 118, 232 N.W.2d 114, 118 (1975) (appellant
arguing that rents and profits derived from the default property after a foreclosure sale
are mortgagee assets).
66. It is easy to observe how these principles were confused in Minnesota. During
the Great Depression, the Minnesota Supreme Court decisions actually contradict each
other. The court in Bowen v. Bankers Life Co. held redemption principles as separate.
Bowen v. Bankers Life Co., 185 Minn. 35, 38, 239 N.W. 774, 775 (1931). In Blaisdell
v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n, the court blurred these principles by declaring the
period of equitable redemption may offset the right of statutory redemption. Blaisdell
v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 433, 249 N.W. 334, 338 (1933).
67. See supra note 61 and cases cited.
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for criminal acts that defeat security in real property.68 This distinc-
tion, however, was apparently not clearly expressed for the courts to
construe. 9
In 1963, the legislature diluted this subtle distinction between
redemption principles by changing the terms of the particular
statute.7° As a result, the courts overlooked the equity of redemp-
tion.7 In 1993, the legislature revised the statute to address redemp-
tion issues but continued to ignore the fundamental distinction.72
Today, the real confusion in Minnesota courts is centered on the
equity of redemption and when it ends: whether at the foreclosure sale
or at the end of the statutory redemption period."
68. Act of Mar. 4, 1869, ch. 64, 1869 MINN. GEN. LAWS 78. This statute states:
That no mortgagor or other person shall remove any building,
fixture or fence, situate or being upon any real estate on which...
any... lien exists, either before or after the foreclosure of such
mortgage or sale in satisfaction of such lien, to the prejudice of any
holder of such mortgage or lien.
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
69. Numerous Minnesota court decisions up to the late 1930s served to blur the
legislative distinction between equitable and statutory redemption. Seesupranotes 61-62
and accompanying text.
70. Compare supra note 68 (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1869, ch. 64, 1869 MINN. GEN.
LAws 78) with MINN. STAT. § 609.615 (1963), which states in part: "Whoever removes
or damages real property which is subject to a mortgage, mechanic's lien, or contract for
deed, with intent to impair the value of the property, without the consent of the
security holder may be sentenced as follows...." Id. (emphasis added). The 1963
statute dropped the 1869 reference to before or after the foreclosure sale and
ambiguously states "subject to a mortgage." Id.
71. See supra note 62, cases cited and accompanying text.
72. The ambiguity of redemption principles remains despite the revised 1993
statute. Compare supra note 70 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.615 (1963)) with MINN. STAT.
§ 609.615 (Supp. 1993), which states in part:
Whoever removes or damages real property which is subject to a
mortgage, mechanic's lien, or contract for deed, induding during the
period of time allowed for redemption, with intent to impair the value of
the property, without the consent of the security holder, may be
sentenced as follows ....
Id. (emphasis added to illustrate new reference to redemption periods).
73. Minnesota case law is contradictory in this regard. Several cases imply the
equity of redemption ends at foreclosure while others imply it terminates at the end
of the statutory period. See State v. Zacher, 490 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Minn. Ct App. 1992)
(explaining that the mortgage no longer exists as a security interest after foreclosure,
thereby implying that equitable redemption terminates at the foreclosure sale);
Gardner v. W.M. Prindle & Co., 185 Minn. 147, 151, 240 N.W. 351, 353 (1932) (stating
that even though the mortgagor's estate is insolvent, whatever right the mortgagee has
under a mortgage to collect rent is terminated at the foreclosure sale); cf Farmers and
Merchants Bank of Preston v. Junge, 458 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. Ct App. 1990)
(ruling that equitable title purchased at a foreclosure sale does not pass until the end
of the redemption period); Kooda Bros. Constr. Co. v. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
of Alexandria, 400 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that covenants of
1995]
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III. THE ZAcER DECISION
A. The Facts
John Zacher executed a $50,000 mortgage loan with Staples State
Bank."4 Zacher secured this loan with the building he owned.7"
The bank based the loan amount upon the appraised future value of
the building, which included improvements Zacher intended to make
with $20,000 of the loan.76 The mortgage stipulated that the secured
property included "all existing or later added improvements and
fixtures.""
Zacher defaulted on his loan and the bank foreclosed by advertise-
ment.7" The bank purchased Zacher's property at the foreclosure
sale for the full amount of the mortgage plus interest.79 Thereafter,
Zacher remained in possession of the property, subject to his statutory
right of redemption.0 The controversy arose when Zacher removed
fixtures from his building only one day before the statutory redemp-
tion period was to expire.8 ' The items removed by Zacher were later
found in his storage facility.
8 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling,
finding John Zacher guilty of defeating a security interest in real
property under Minnesota Statute Section 609.615.8' The Minnesota
Court of Appeals had held that the removed fixtures were not subject
to a mortgage after the foreclosure sale.84 Judge Short dissented. 5
title in a mortgage survive the foreclosure sale and terminate at the end of the statutory
period).






80. Id.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 580.23 (1) (1994) (stating that a residential property
owner has six months, commencing from the foreclosure sale event, to redeem his
property by paying the foreclosure sale amount in cash).
81. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d at 469.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 473.
84. Id. at 151-52.
85. Id. Judge Short asserted that a mortgage continues to function after a
foreclosure sale. Id. Judge Short also maintained that the mortgagee purchaser at the
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The State of Minnesota appealed the holding and petitioned the
supreme court for review.
8 6
B. The Court's Analysis
In Zacher, the supreme court deemed the controversy to be an issue
of statutory interpretation and thus a question of law for de novo
review.87 To reach its decision, the court evaluated case law within
the jurisdiction 8 and considered the legislative intent behind the
statute.8 9 The court also considered an intervening social policy
argument by the Minnesota Mortgage Bankers Associationf 0
Zacher argued that his mortgage expired upon foreclosure, and
thus, the bank's security interest in his property expired with the
foreclosure action.91 The court found that this reasoning would
render the statute meaningless. 92 The supreme court held, en banc,
that Zacher's property continued to be subject to the mortgage after
the foreclosure sale and until the statutory redemption period
expired.93 The court limited this decision to mortgagees as purchas-
ers for acts under the criminal statute.94
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ZACHER DECISION
The Zacher court correctly ruled that a mortgage continues to act as
security through the statutory redemption period.95 The court's
analysis, however, does not adequately explain this decision.
Because the mortgage debt is extinguished at foreclosure, the
mortgage as a remedy no longer exists." It is logical, therefore, to
conclude that a security interest in mortgaged property also terminates
upon foreclosure.97 The doctrine of equitable redemption, however,
developed to preserve the mortgage as a security device and to avoid
86. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1993) (No.
CO-92-117).
87. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Minn. 1993).
88. Id. at 471-72.
89. Id. at 472.
90. Id. The court considered the argument that additional costs would arise from
a mortgage transaction that did not cover the mortgagee's interest during the statutory
redemption period. Id. The cost of placing the property into receivership status would
be high and cumbersome to legally achieve. I& at 471.
91. Id. at 470.
92. Id. at 473.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 470.
95. Id. at 472.
96. Id. Respondent Zacher argued this premise before the court of appeals.
Zacher, 490 N.W.2d at 150.
97. Zacher, 490 N.W.2d at 151.
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unjust property taking.98  The historic intent behind equitable
redemption firmly supports the court ruling that a mortgage continues
to act as security through the statutory redemption period.99
The Zacher court failed to interpret Minnesota Statute Section
609.615 within the context of its common law origin. °° With the
enactment of the statute in 1869, the legislature declared that a
security interest in mortgaged land existed before and continued after
the foreclosure sale.'0 In essence, the 1869 legislature enacted a
statutory extension of the common law principle of equitable
redemption.0 2 Even though the Zacher court correctly presumed the
legislature's true intent, the concept of common law redemption was
not explained.1
03
Furthermore, the Zacher court failed to clarify the principles of
equitable and statutory redemption and their significance to Minneso-
ta redemption rights."° The court did not address whether the
extension of common law equity through the statutory redemption
period extinguished the redemption statute or whether the two
principles are to operate concurrently.0 5 By holding as it did, the
Minnesota Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify the law
behind Minnesota redemption rights.
The problems presented by the Zacher decision can be resolved by
judicially distinguishing common law and statutory redemption in a
future case. Alternatively, the Minnesota Legislature could respond to
the Zacher decision by modifying the present statutory terms of
98. 2 HILLIARD, supra note 6, ch. 26, §§ 1-2, at 30-31. The concept of correlative
rights between the mortgagor (equitable redemption) and mortgagee (strict
foreclosure) preserved the mortgage instrument as a security device. 2 id.; see also 1
OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 12-14.
99. See 1 OSBoRNE, supra note 8, § 6, at 13.
100. The court reviewed early case law but failed to assess the later confusion of
terms. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d at 471-72.
101. See supra note 70.
102. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (ruling the bank had a security interest
in the property Zacher removed after the foreclosure sale).
103. See id. at 470-72. Although the court reviewed case law and argued statutory
intent, the court failed to explain the principle of equitable redemption and its
similarity to statutory redemption. Id. This is important because history holds the two
principles separate by application, despite their similar functions. See supra notes 21
and 100.
104. See Zacher, 504 N.W.2d at 470-71 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.615 (1990), which
declares the removal of property from mortgaged land a criminal act but fails to
distinguish Minnesota redemption rights and their significance to the origins of the
statute).
105. Id. In contrast, Minnesota courts have previously held that the period of
equitable redemption may be extended to offset the statutory period of redemption.
Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 433, 249 N.W. 334, 338 (1931),
affd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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Minnesota Statute Section 609.615.1"6 This would clear up any
confusion that a court may have by better defining present redemp-
tion rights. Such change would be consistent with the spirit of the
Zacher decision, which tries to make the statute useful.
10 7
Also, several legislative scenarios are possible to correct the problem.
First, the legislature could extend the equitable redemption period.
By putting off the finality of foreclosure, the mortgagor would have a
longer period of time to bring the mortgage payments up to date.
This solution, however, could function as a disadvantage to the
mortgagee by making endless possession possible for the mortgag-
or.
1 08
Second, the legislature could repeal statutory redemption. The
mortgagor's "right" to redeem the property would end with the
foreclosure. Under this form of foreclosure, the mortgagor may
recover a market value on the property because the redemption
statute "cloud" is no longer present. The mortgagor, however, has less
time to bring the mortgage up to date and would be unable to
refinance the debt."°
The solution lies in balancing powers between the mortgagor and
mortgagee. It is possible to get the best of both scenarios. The
legislature could amend the statute to allow statutory redemption only
in situations where the mortgagee is the purchaser.110 Other buyers
could bid with the security of receiving instant "clear" tide.' This
would create a competitive bidding process the mortgagee could not
106. In Koenigs v. Travis, the court held that it is the province of the legislature and
not of the court to modify rules of common law. Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 480,
75 N.W.2d 478, 487 (1956) (citing Congdon v. Congdon 160 Minn. 343, 362, 200 N.W.
76, 82 (1924)).
107. State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. 1993) (stating the statute would
be meaningless if the court were to accept Zacher's argument that the mortgage (and
thus, the mortgagee-purchaser's security interest in the property) was extinguished).
108. This imbalance has been created before. Medieval England developed the
mortgagee's right of strict foreclosure to balance this potential threat of endless
mortgagor possession. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
109. History has also seen this imbalance. Statutory redemption was created in
response to strict foreclosure, as a remedy for price inadequacies that arose through
foreclosure actions. See supra note 38.
110. Amending the statute would avoid future confusion of redemption principles.
The Zacher court established that a mortgage is a security device until the end of the
statutory redemption period. This decision, however, does not address the very
purpose of statutory redemption: to mitigate foreclosure sale price inadequacies. See
supra note 38. When the mortgagee is the purchaser of the property and market value
is not achieved, statutory redemption should be used to mitigate the price inadequacy
that arises in the mortgagee-purchaser situation. See, e.g., 1 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 8,
at 18.
111. Without statutory redemption, bidders at the foreclosure sale could purchase
clear title without a redemption term encumbrance. See supra note 46.
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avoid and, ultimately, a foreclosure sale price at or near fair market
value. 112  At the same time, the mortgagor is given a means to
redeem his property or reduce the windfall that a mortgagee often
gains through foreclosure.'"
3
This solution avoids the use of financial hardship as an acquisition
device."' By repealing statutory redemption, except when a mort-
gagee is the purchaser, a "balanced" price would be derived through
clear, unencumbered, market potential. It may prevent other people
in John Zacher's predicament from taking their sweat-equity out of the
banker's purse.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, redemption rights arose from common law and later
became regulated by statute. Although Minnesota originally distin-
guished each redemption right, over time these principles became
confused."' The Zacher decision declared that common law equity
does not end at the fall of the foreclosure sale hammer." 6 Rather,
it continues through the statutory redemption period for acts that
defeat a security interest in real property.' 
7
By the court's approach, the mortgagee's security interest in a
foreclosed property is still unclear. The Zacherdecision failed to clarify
the underlying confusion between equitable and statutory redemption
in Minnesota. Given a future case, the Minnesota Judiciary should
112. It is ironic that perhaps the sound way to achieve maximum market price at
a foreclosure sale is to dispose of, or greatly limit, the present redemptory statute.
After all, the historic aim of redemption statutes is to achieve price adequacy. See supra
note 38.
113. This way the mortgagor is protected by statutory redemption in the worst case
scenario: the market is so depressed no one shows up for the sale and the mortgagee
purchases the property for the debt owed. Statutory redemption would, of course,
allow the mortgagor a period of time after the sale to fix this price inadequacy by
refinancing the foreclosed property.
114. See supra note 34. Courts of equity abhor a forfeiture. The common law
concept of balanced powers developed equitable redemption and strict foreclosure as
corollary rights. 2 HILUARD, supra note 6, ch. 26, §§ 1-2, at 30-31; 1 OSBORNE, supra
note 8, § 6, at 12-14.
115. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text, establishing the confusion of
redemption terms by Minnesota courts.
116. See State v. Zacher, 504 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Minn. 1993) (stating the bank had
a security interest in John Zacher's property that continued after the foreclosure sale
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better define statutory and equitable redemption and their significance
to Minnesota redemption rights. Alternatively, the Minnesota
Legislature could statutorily respond.
Thomas W Bigley
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MEMORIAL FOR CHIEF JUDGE ANNE SIMONETV
t The following are the eulogies that were given at the memorial services for
ChiefJudge Simonett held on May 9, 1995 at the church of the Nativity of Our Lord
in St. Paul, Minnesota.
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